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Germany's Joreig'l trade dUNll(l fil' yeoI'll oj war
is the ltubjea oj thill article. fUhicl. was lel£graphed
10 ttll Jrom Bcrlin.
when such supplies were delivered within
the compass of mutual trade agr·coments.
On. tho other hand, the large Huppl.ies of
arms and war materials delivered by Ger·
many in the form of military aid to her
allies, a,ro not included in foreign-trade
statistics. This aid to hor aBie:! represents
several times the value of the matf.'rinl
actually bought lIoud must be regarded a,~
cOll8iderable additional oxports on the part
of Germany.
The increase of Oenuany's foreign trade
is not diminished if one takes into account
the rilling prices among her. partners in
trade. For all,hough the wholesale-price
index in 1Io number of countries on Lho Con·
tinent has risen by 100 per cent or more
since the beginning of the war, Germany
herself with her oontrolled econOlnicB forms
0. stable islaml ill the Bpburc of prices.
Moreover, Germa.ny has made long-tcrm
reciproclll price ll~eDt8 with Ul at of
hur trade pe.rtners, 80 that the quantity
and value of the trnde with Germany is oIte!)
hardly affected by price fluctuations. Hence
German exports have rison during the war
in quantity too.
BALANCED FORFlIOK TRAm,;
The above figur.es show tha.t, t.hanks to
Germany's unbroken eX]'Jort strength, Ger-
man foreign trade could be kept more or
less balanced' throughout the years of WRr.
Neither in the case of imports nor o.f exports
was there any considerable or continued
surplus. 'fhe only exception is to be found
in 1M2, when thore was an import 8urplull
whether any such sche.me bas already rna·
terialized. Thero is still more than one
problem to be I:lolved, a.ud the relilLbility- of
the gas turbine depend.s to a great extent
on tho durability and other qualities of the
metals used in tho construction of the engine.
It Can be safely predicted, however, that
these problems will be solved sooner or later,
and that this newest of prime movcrs is
facing a great future.
THE GAS TURBINE
g engine for aircraft. It is only a-
of time before the gllS turbine in its
pie8t· form is developed to so smaU a
and weight and yet to so high an ef·
y that it will be ab1e to compete with
ClO1Dhustion engincs now solely employod
this purj.lOse. It is pretty certain that
and designs of airplanes with a gas·
'ne drive have boon drawn up Rnd
ted; .but it is more than doubtful
HE restraint impo.cd by the W&r
upon the publict\,tion of German
foreign. trade figuros bll~ led to a
llIetbora of rumors and statements regarding
JJermlUlY's Lmde rellLLioll. with the rest of
pe. The fifth anniversary of the out·
of the Will' seems au opportune time
Pl'elMWt a picture of the actual course
by' Connany's foreign trade. Let us
begin. with the figures themselves.
Without the Ost-mark (former Austria)
they were as follows:
Year Imports Exports
(i,1 billiOtl Reiohll1'lC.rk)
1938 0.4 6.2
1939 4.8 5.2
19-i0 lI.O 4.9
IIlJ 1 G.O 6.8
1942 8.7 7.(1
11/43 IUJ 8.U
Tbcso few figures speak their own lan·
page. The interruption of connectionll
"Itb overseas resulting from the outbreak of
~ Jed at fLrSt tOll. slight decrease in foreign
t:nwJo. This decrease was, however, soon
-.de up for by directing tbe trade that
formerly went overseas to tile };uropea.n
continent. As time went on, Gorma.ny
auooooded in c01l8iderauJy increasing tbe
.economic ties with the friendly and neutral
countries of :Europe in spite of tho war.
The lll'any y('urs of preliminary work put
into the trado with 80uthcIl.';tern Europe
lfote particularly fnliUuI. The growth in
&rade continued without interruption, so
th,at the figures for ]943 for importll as weH
'18 for exports exceed the prewar figures by
00 per cent.
The figures qnoted refer to aotual trade
only. Supplies of war material to allied
and - friendly' countries are only included
THE XXth OENTURY .
TRADE ~H THE NEUTRALS
amounts foreign laborers are permitt«l ~
take out when they go on leave, etc.
Although the major part of Germany'.
foreign trade in thc Wl\r goes to the allied'
and frieJ,ldly countries and the occupied
territories. the trade with the neutrals is by
no means insignificant, and this applies again
to both sides. Some of the neutrals are
perhaps even more dependent on the trade
with Germany than the other way round,
all the more so as a properly functioning
transit of goods throughout Europe is im·
possible during the war without the aid of
Germany. The trade of the neutral coun-
tries of the Continent has always been
. directed chiefly at the other European
oOlmtries, and during the war this depend-
ence haa increased oOllsiderably. Thus, for
instance, over 85 per cent of Sweden's trade
is with the countries of the Continent and
must to a large extent avail itself of traDllit
through Germany, although German com·
municat.ions are sufficiently strained by the
war. Switzerland, who is entirely sur·
rounded by the German sphere of power, is'
in a similar position. As far as these two
neutrals are stilI able tG maintain a convoy
traffic with overseas, this is also only pos-
sible with Germany's compliance.
But even with Germany alone, not in·
cluding the occupied territories, the economic
ties of the European countries are such that
there are few neutral or friendly countries
in whose foreign trade Germany's share does
not amount to 50 or even 70 to 80 per oent.
Germany haa seen to it that her trade with
the neutrals is balaneed, so that no large
or continued debt can a.ril;e 011 either side.
H Germany is obtaining valuable ores or
essential industrial products from some of ~
the friendly or neutral colmtries, this is not
due only to a particularly accommodating
spirit on the part of her trade partners:
Germany pays for thl'~ with no less valuable
or indispensable goods. For example, Ger-
many has undertaken to supply the coal
requirement08 not only of her allies but of
varions neutral oountries as well. As a
consequence, Germany's industry and the
German consumer have had to put up with
a eurtailment of their own supplies. Even
if the German counterblockade were not
there to prevent it, the Allies would by no
means be able to undertake such huge coal
supplies to the neutrals, since Germany's
opponents are themselves suffering from a
of 1.1 billion Reichsmark. This led at the
time to 0. certain clearing debt on the part
of Germany; but in 1943 the first step toward
the bringing about of a baln.ncc was already
made. As a l'1l8ult, the past year closed
with a surplus of 300 million Reichsrnark
on the export side. In all cases where
individual countries still have genuine clear·
ing demands on Germany, this is due solely
to delays in delivery occasioned by present
conditions; these delays will rapidly be made
up for after the conclusion of peace by
Germany's industry, whose capacity has
been \'astly increased by war production.
At any rate, Germany's genuine clearing
debts are Dluch lower than, for instance.
England's debts to the Empire and the
neutrals, not to montion the Lend-Lease
debts. With the allied and friendly coun-
tries, Germany wus even able to achieve an
act,ive baJa-nee, for Germany delivered far
more to her allies than she received from
them.
Germany's trade with southeastern Europe
showed an active surplus of together almost
300 million Rcichsmark for the years 1941
and 1942. In other words, Germl\ny is
placing her economio strength at the dis-
posal of her allies, even if this means con·
siderable curtailments fo~ the German con-
sumer. If Germany is importing surpluses
in agricultural products and raw materials
from her allies, she in turn is supplying
industrial products and consnmer goods
which are indispensable for the maintenance
of the econ~mic structure of those coun·
tries.
It Dlay seem contradictory that., in spite
of this active trade balance, Germany's
balance of payments with her allies shows &
considerable debit. But these debits do
not arise frQm any disparity in trade. In
part Germany's p888ive .balance of payment.s
is to be explained by the long terms she
allows for the payment of her industrial
supplies. Above all, however, Germany has
to undertako considerable burdens for ac-
count of services rendered; for example, she
has to compensate her allies for the large
costs arising from the transporting and
feeding of German troops. Another constant
weighty burden is represented by the remit.
tances of wages made by the foreign laborers
who, in 1~ alone. sent home savings
amounting to 960 million marks. From
1940 to 19!3, savings totaling more than 2
billion marks were transferred abroad in this
way. This figure does. not include the
THE KAISER OF AMERICA
I III
H8rO wor6hip '6 ~mbedded in 'he 60ul oj ellery
nation. In liIM oj war upecially, a na'ion
create. 14!gendary figuru. The figuru 6Urrotmded
by /hue legend" al1lXJy6 throw a revwlin.g r'ighl on
1M mentality oj 1M nation tAat hfU ch06en them.
The story of his rise runs true to the
demands of American legend. Born the
son of a poor cobbler in New York, Kaiser's
first successful venture was in the photo-
graphio business. Soon after the turn of the
century, however, he went to the American
Northwest, and here ~ turned into the
typical Westerner in the unfettered seope of
his thoughts and actions. He started a
sand and gravel business, and by 1913 he
was working-<>n his own and with a small
capital-at his first public contract, the
surfacing of a highway. From then on he
made his living by public contracts, profiting
from his contract IJrices and building up his
business as a. road contractor. In the first
few years after the Great War, he was able
to merge fifteen sand and grave pits into
his busines.'1 and combined his various enter·
prises under the name of "Henry J. Kaiser
Co., Ltd."
After handling highway contracts in all
parts of the country during the twenties,
he succeeded in his first really big deal in
connection with the construction of Boulder
Dam. The contracts for this enterprise
were of such a size that neither Kaiser nor
any other single contractor on the West
Coa.'!t could have undertaken to fill them.
So Kaiser arranged the merger of six firms
Germany is aware of the fact that in-
terstate commerce in war time must be
based on give and take, on reciprocity.
Without the import of essential raw mo.·
terials or valuable machinery and consumer
goods from Germany the economic structure
of most of the countries of the Continent
could not be maintained. An internlption
of the supplies from Germany and the cessa·
tion of the rich marketing possibilities in
Germany would plunge these countries into
a serioliS economio crisis with growing un·
employment. By maintaining its high
standard, Germany's foreign trade ha.~ be·
come the economic backoone of a Continent
at war.
GERM..U.'Y'S TRADE- L~ EUROPE
Tbere is not a single country on the Con-
tiDent which could do without its vital
,-.pplies from Germany. One glance at the
diBplay windows of the large shops in the
-.pitalll of the neutral or friendly countries
"008 to show what Germany is still ex-
porting in the way of high-quality con-
llIJDer goods, although the home demand
SUIt often remain unsatisfied. The German
OOII8umer finds it by no means easy to forego
'IlIcll conveniences of a high standard of
Ping, but he regards this as one of the
'MCl'ifices to be made in war time.
DURING the Great War it was HenryFord who-probably unintentionally-became a legendary figure; in this
~ar a similar myth is being built up around
Henry Kaiser. Like Ford, Kaiser is already
ngarded as being the creator of modem
war production, and, like Ford, he is ex·
pected to introduce a golden postwar decade
and to exploit the gigantic eq uipment of the
war potential for peaceful purposes after the
war. The purpose of this propaganda for
Kaiser is, above all, to emphasize that it is
Dot the anonymous machinery of the state
which has made possible the tremendous
war production but, as has always been the
case in America, private enterprise, for
which new record achievements are being
olaimed, particularly since the outbreak of
war.
It is, however, rather questionable whether
this private enterprise is being done a service
by limelighting Kaiser of all people. For Kai·
IleJ"S undertakings lack tho very feature
characterizing the nature of private enter·
prise, " feature which Ford po8BC88ed to a
marked extent: personal risk, the investment
of private capital. Kaiser is the representa.
tive of an economic system which cannot
possibly exist without the state as the sup·
porter and initiator of the enterprise. Kaiser
has always done business with the state
only, received his funds from the state, and
risen to his present position by means of
the state. Without the state he would be
nothing, for he is not an entrepreneur in the
true sense but only a "contro.ctor."
